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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the notion of quality in higher education 
with particular focus on ‘objectifying through articulation’ the assessment of quality by professional 
experts. The paper gives an overview of the differentiations of quality as used in higher education. It 
explores a substantial piece of evaluation research which was carried out between 2009 and 2011 by 
the authors at the Institute for Work Based Learning at Middlesex University.  
 
Higher education context 
What is the essence of quality, how can we judge the extent of it and how can experts account for the 
basis on which they make such judgements. These are fundamental questions which have not been 
readily addressed in the literature on quality of higher education. For instance in the seminal paper 
by Harvey and Green (1993) they suggested that quality is used in five ways in higher education 
debate: excellence, perfection, fitness for purpose, value for money and transformation and how 
quality as such can contribute to some of the various functions that education can claim to influence. 
These terms do not move much beyond a dictionary definition and are clearly instrumentalising 
terms – even the dictionary goes further with defining quality as also being about characteristics and 
attributes - the inner quality of quality. This inner quality may be avoided in use precisely because as 
Harvey and Green stated quality is a value-laden term: it is subjectively associated with that which is 
good and worthwhile but fails to define these subsequent terms so a differentiation of quality itself is 
avoided. This work, important though it is and much of the work that follows it (Van Kemenade et 
al. 2008), (although in latter works Harvey and Newton,2004 and Harvey 2006 this has been 
addressed) does not address the question as to what quality might be but rather how what is being 
measured: teaching effectiveness, institutional controls or the usefulness of research, can be said to 
be quality. Filippakou (2011) illustrated this process and argued that the dominant discourses of 
quality can be identified: the discourse of quality assurance and the discourse of quality enhancement 
and beneath them the secondary discourse of assessment and accountability all of which serve the 
ideology of power and control. This position has resonance with Barnett who argued that ‘[the] 
debate over quality in higher education should be seen for what it is: a power struggle where the use 
of terms reflects a jockeying for position in the attempt to impose definitions of higher education’ 
(Barnett, 1992, p. 6). Iacovidou et al. (2009) indicated that the literature also suggests that quality is 
not a unitary concept and as a result it must be defined as criteria or dimensions of quality as referred 
to in various studies, such as support services, university reputation and programmes of study. 
Moreover it is differently defined by the various stakeholders to higher education. In this paper we 
set out to try to clarify some notion of quality so that we might be able to use the term in ways that 
ensure that the attributing and possession of it can be determined. 
The task of clarifying the meaning of quality is important in all senses of education but as higher 
education seeks to find useful partnerships and enter into closer knowledge exchange with 
organizations outside of higher education, the criteria of assessing quality of work, of people, of 
fitness for purpose, fitness to be a member of a profession or be promoted become increasingly 
essential to both explore and articulate. Assessment of quality can be culture/context bound, 
discriminatory, subjective, based on prejudice as much and as often as it can be seen to be objective 
and ethical. No appeals can be made on the basis of academic judgements in academia (regulations) 
and few are brave enough to challenge the expert examiners or the professional experts who are 
guardians of the professional gates. However with students and trainees becoming consumers and 
employment law becoming more accessible through the employment tribunal system, experts have to 
be accountable for their judgements of quality. As will be seen in the research below, higher 
education has a role to play in assisting professional bodies to assist in the articulation of expert 
judgement of quality to meet standards of accountability as well as challenging the assumption in 
higher education that experts deliver quality judgements by reason of being an expert. 
 
A lens for looking at quality 
This paper uses the analogy of ‘truth’ as a lens through which to look at the notion of quality. 
Various theories and views of truth have been discussed, mainly in philosophy literature, where the 
basis for deciding what can be taken as truth has been generally dealt with under five substantive 
theories: correspondence, coherence, constructivism, consensus and pragmatism.  
 
• The correspondence theory of truth is dependent upon the relationship of the beliefs to other 
things that are taken to be an actual state of affairs or an objective reality. Importantly, truth 
in this sense is not based upon any internal quality of the beliefs only on correspondence with 
the facts. The problem with this is the implication  that if there is correspondence with the 
facts, the rationale is not necessary as the association is dissolved as both statement 
predicated and fact are the same.  
• The coherence theory of truth has internal consistency and logical standards as central, and 
completeness and comprehensiveness are critical to the whole system. That is, any subset of 
the whole is implied by all of the others taken as premises and is valuable as the convictions 
assumed above tend to be very difficult to exclusively establish  
• The pragmatic theory argues that the utility of a belief is a good measure of truth value; it is 
an expedient theory of truth 
 
• The constructive theory of truth recognises that truth is derived from the meaning that is 
made out of the interaction with things rather than the observation of them 
• The consensus theory of truth implies that the more people agree with something the more 
true it becomes    
For the purposes of using theories of truth as a lens through which to look at the notion of 
quality in higher education we considered the first three to have more relevance to the case 
study we are presenting.  In respect to truth, correspondence, coherence and pragmatism are 
borrowed to build a structure; a family of meanings for quality in higher education 
(constructivism is briefly mentioned in the context of social construction of reality). Such an 
approach owes much to Wittgenstein’s clear and simple language-games which are set up as 
‘objects of comparison’ to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of 
similarities, but also of dissimilarities’ (Wittgenstein, 1999, §130: 50e  
Pragmatism is the most recent of the three main theories of truth and attempts to deal with some of 
the limitations in the correspondence and coherence views. These limitations include the possibility 
of a coherent set of beliefs that do not correspond with reality and the difficulty in selecting and 
identifying facts for correspondence.  
All three of these forms of truth reveal what is meant in different ways but with a clear, common, 
overarching resemblance and relevance for the way in which they make claims as to what can be 
considered as truth which can be appropriate to higher education discourse on quality particularly in 
relation to Filippakou’s concerns. ‘Quality regimes in higher education, one might say, influence the 
ways in which the meaning of higher education is interpreted, and perhaps defined, by limiting other 
interested parties’ power to influence the debate’ Filippakou (2011, p. 17). What then would each of 
the above theories look like when defining quality in higher education? 
Correspondence theory requires that the beliefs of what higher education ought to be are matched by 
what it is. This perhaps is the critical issue in the often-muted ‘crisis in higher education’ as the 
purpose of higher education is not clear to all its stakeholders. Clarity in this definition allows for 
correspondence to be asserted through monitoring, reflection and metrics. Quality higher education is 
that which matches with the requirement of higher education regardless of the virtues of that belief. 
Moreover if higher education is a diverse sector then the meaning of quality can retain a root in 
correspondence theory and differ for each of the main institutions. Quality is not contingent upon 
clear beliefs as to what education is and confers no special status in and of itself. It is a way of 
judging what education is. It can be measured in a wide range of ways that may be referred to as 
quality assurance. Support for this way of conceiving quality over the correspondence theory is 
offered by Wittgenstein, who argues that what we believe is not ‘single axioms that strike me as 
obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support (italics 
in original, 1975, §142, page21e Moreover, he argues our ‘knowledge forms an enormous system. 
And only within this system has a partial bit the value we give it’ (1975, §420:, page 52e)  
Coherence theory of quality requires a more constructivist approachto quality. Quality is about the 
coherence and consistence of how higher education is addressed. This definition extends beyond the 
needs of the institutions and includes societal, economic and political dimensions of what can be 
taken as higher education. It would set higher education in a community context and make 
judgement not just on the delivery of teaching or research but on the funding, social purpose and 
societal contributions of the members of higher education institutions. Quality here might be 
measured by value for money only if this concept was part of the complex network in which higher 
education itself was defined. To privilege one way of evaluating quality whilst pressurising the 
whole context of higher education that creates tensions in the network can be inappropriate. Quality 
in this context would be that which supports the system of higher education and which, if it were 
based on a notion of markets, would allow the market to determine what a relevant return on 
personal and social capital would be without the intervention of the state. 
. Here the quality of higher education is pragmatic in that  it achieves what is required; that it is a 
useful contribution to the outcome of higher education. Clearly this is dependent on an agreed notion 
of the purpose of higher education, which to ‘justify our beliefs and desires to ourselves and to our 
fellow-agents subjects us to these norms and obedience  to these norms produces a behavioural 
pattern that we must detect in others before confidently attributing beliefs to them’ (Rorty, 1998, p. 
26). Quality has no intrinsic link with what higher education is; it is simply a measure of how well, 
effective or efficient an institution is in providing the benefits it claims for itself and its stakeholders. 
James (1907, p. 46) stated that true ideas ‘are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and 
verify. False ideas are those that we cannot’. Indeed, the ancient practice of Oxford and Cambridge 
of providing degrees with examinations could be considered of higher quality provided that the 
holders of these unlearnt and perhaps un-merited degrees were able to achieve the intended goal. 
Failure to practise as a successful doctor regardless of the certificate that assented to your profession 
would, sooner or later, be revealed. 
Given three definitive forms of quality, what is required to establish that the phenomenon of quality 
exists in each of the three cases above? To do this will require investigating what can be taken as 
evidence-of the three forms of quality. The method for securing evidence is not evidence itself and 
this is of critical importance to the notion of quality in any context. How can ‘evidence-of’ be 
established which provides reliability whilst not falling foul of rigour? Perhaps, a  beginning is to ask 
the  right question, ‘What act or agency signifies that evidence is “evidence-of”’?’ This question may 
be modified when the next question concerns  what level of confidence is required  in the evidence 
that is claimed when used to reveal that the evidence is ‘evidence-of’ quality. The question then 
becomes ‘In what can anyone  generally have confidence, and what is required for anyone  to hold 
such a belief that something is providing “evidence-of” quality?’  This realignment of what is 
knowable into what is it prudent to believe, that is prudent in the Aristotelian sense of the insight and 
foresight that informs judgement rather than its more modern usage of cautiousness, shifts the point 
of reference from certainty to judgement. The value of evidence has been conflated with the notion 
of ‘evidence-of’, and this blurs the epistemic relationship that causes the misuse of the notion of 
‘evidence-of’ in evidence-based quality practices. In this paper it is suggested  that by articulating the 
relationship, important questions for evidence-based practice and policy can be raised (Kvernbekk, 
2009; Boaz et al., 2008; Biesta, 2007; Hammersley, 2005) and if the practice of quality in higher 
education is to be understood and applied in different contexts rather than being used to describe the 
context itself (institutional quality rather than educational quality) then, having determined the 
difference, quality might more relevantly be applied to work-based higher education.  
As illustrated above, ‘evidence-of’ quality depends on what one  takes quality to be. For instance in 
the case of a correspondence notion of quality, evidence is commonly assumed to be assured, so long 
as evidence has a particular epistemological nature, usually based on certain forms of empirical 
research design. These privileged designs are given epistemic priority over other forms of knowledge 
contained in judgements, expertise and experience of practitioners (Bridges, Smeyers & Smith, 
2009). This restricted use of epistemic claims for evidence inhibits an ability to creatively form new 
ideas of quality or to verify the existence of quality that remains concealed through empirical 
methodologies (such as  happiness, contentment, more community responsibility). The privileging of 
one form of evidence production over others dissolves the meaning of certain forms of quality where 
the simulacra of quality measurement itself ceases to stand for, but becomes, the signifier of quality. 
Such assumptions are fallible, for should the evidence indeed not be ‘evidence-of’ quality education 
but of a spurious correlation, such as proficiency in form filling or teaching to metrics, the evidence 
of quality (not the measurement of quality) lacks plausibility.  
Second, in respect of coherence justification of quality, the use of a contextual reference bears upon 
an epistemic system or web of propositions. The epistemic relationship stems from the accumulated 
coherence of the evidence selected and can be conceived as a cohesive referential whole in which it 
is grounded and which is familiar. The  use of the word ‘whole’ here is intended to refer to the 
totality of evidential structure that is evoked and from which it is logically sound to make a claim of 
evidence. It seems plausible that to increase confidence in the understanding of what evidence is, it is 
necessary to understand the ‘totality’ of the circumstance in which the evidence is revealed as 
‘evidence-of’. This will require portfolio entities whose attribution of evidence is determined by their 
relationship to others and to the specific notion of quality. This collection forms a relevant CRW that 
is intended to contribute to others knowing something for ‘certain’ where this certainty is based on 
the coherence of their association with each other. This does not mean that all possible forms of 
evidence are present, and indeed the cohesive referential whole is open to additional evidence, 
confirmative, collaborative or opposing to the evidential claim. Recognising which entities gain the 
legitimacy to be included in a cohesive referential whole may be based on a priori arguments or a 
posteriori justification both of which can contribute to a judgement as to the strength of the claim of 
a cohesive referential whole. Sufficiency in reducing risk regarding the level of certainty seems to 
require a portfolio of evidence to be collected which is pertinent to the specific epistemic relationship 
being investigated. These items might be included on the basis that something else is true; that is ‘X’ 
is evidence provided that ‘V’ (a definition of quality) is true. Membership of a cohesive referential 
whole is restricted to those entities that directly and intentionally bear on the issue requiring 
evidence. Inclusion within a cohesive referential whole might be contingent upon a second or third 
variable to be coherent with the propositional claim such as assessment, funding and so on. This 
position accepts that there needs to be criteria, rules or judgements within each context to determine 
if entities present can be part of a cohesive referential whole and this infers that not everything 
present-to-hand will enhance the justification of the belief of quality existing that is proposed. 
The pragmatic approach is based on justifiable belief as to what is worthy of facilitating our actions 
toward a purpose which is arrived at through edifying conversations within an appropriate 
community. Evidence ought to justified (although this is not a necessary condition), have an 
explanatory value, a good reason to believe, disentitlement from the subject and when qualified by 
another proposition this proposition is true. In coming to a  decision on whether the justifiable belief 
contributes compellingly to  an understanding of plausibility, confirmation, certainty or fallibility one 
is  dependent upon the explanatory value as the independent criteria of judging if an entity can be 
considered as evidence prior to when it is called upon to be evidence of something. The justifiable 
belief is by its nature temporary in that at a point in time ‘t’ (temporal), the judged content of the 
justifiable belief is sufficient under the relevant consideration to satisfy reasonable beliefs of agent(s) 
to act based on their rational interpretation of this totality. The question then becomes not what is the 
evidence-of the existence of quality in some objective and certain correspondence sense but what can 
one generally have confidence in and what is required to hold such a belief. This seems to be centred 
on the concept of inference that offers a familiarity between language games and how they are 
interpreted and that the interpretation itself cannot be extracted from the background familiarity with 
which inference is applied. Therefore, there will be a tendency  to infer correctly or erroneously from 
what is called  evidence within the prejudices and ideologies that dominate and inculcate our 
societies. Pragmatists, notably Rorty (1998) took truth, as is suggested in this paper with regards to 
quality, with misgiving if it is based upon an appearance-reality distinction as implied in the 
metaphysical nature of correspondence models and this paper  argues for a distinction between less 
useful and more useful ways of talking. 
 
Practical application 
Such an exploration of the functionality of quality as justifiable belief has practical applications for 
all forms of higher education: university; training at postgraduate level for entry into professions; 
accreditation of graduate internships. To illustrate this reference is made to a study conducted by the 
authors on a project completed in 2011. This was a two-year evaluation of a pilot scheme on using 
work based learning for the training of solicitors in England and Wales (Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (SRA), 2011). The intention of the pilot was to experiment with a provision of training that 
would offer standardised assessment criteria across all legal practices, which would encourage 
trainees to self-manage their learning and develop reflective practice in the profession. The purpose 
of assessment was based on judgement of the quality of professional competencies that trainees had 
in order to reach a decision as to whether the individual was considered ready to enter the profession; 
the secondary assessment was whether the individual had the desired dispositions as well as the 
propositional knowledge that the legal firm carrying out the assessment required to offer a place at 
the firm. The decisions arrived at on these two counts had to be shown to be objective and non-
discriminatory. With this firmly in mind the pilot scheme invited vocational paralegals to participate 
as well as law graduates. For the vocational paralegals this would be their only chance to qualify as a 
solicitor. The evaluation threw up a number of challenges for members of the legal profession 
carrying out the assessments as experts. While the rationale behind the scheme was accepted in 
principle, on the whole the experts were not convinced that it was any better than the existing system 
that relied heavily on the judgement of senior members of the firm and took into consideration the 
culture of the context of the individual firms or legal departments. Standardisation of training and 
assessment criteria failed to convince any participant in the scheme (lawyers and trainees) that this 
made newly qualified solicitors transferable across firms and contexts. Challenges in defining quality 
and assessing it were mentioned in every interview (total of 30) of both trainees and supervising 
senior solicitors and rated highly as an area of contention by 80% of 90 participants who also 
responded to a survey. While the pilot scheme was seen by members of the legal profession to be an 
innovative and a much needed challenge to a profession perceived to be embedded in traditional 
forms of training and selection that happen behind closed doors and in making a contribution to 
widening participation, the issue that became one of the key factors in recommending that the SRA 
consult further before rolling out a new training scheme for solicitors was how quality is assessed. 
Defining quality and articulating how to assess it, therefore, became the focus not only of how the 
SRA might move forward but how higher education might grapple with assuring quality of and in 
assessment in more depth in its own context and in preparation for future partnerships and 
collaborations with other professional bodies and organisations running, or intending to run, 
professional trainings, internships and apprenticeships.  
The three notions of quality discussed in this paper contribute to an unravelling of the complexities 
of assessing quality in the training of solicitors that can be adapted to all professional trainings. This 
unravelling is a form of articulation that provides an opening into the most appropriate agents or 
artefacts for assessing quality, which also meets a range of regulatory, professional and market 
requirements.  
To enter the profession of law as a newly qualified solicitor, ‘qualified’ would refer to meeting all 
the correspondence criteria for, in this case, the legal profession’s definition of higher education, its 
rules, regulations and the skills and competencies to be met. Correspondence is through monitoring 
by seniors and reflection in the sense of recognition of something being able to be done better. This 
is done through portfolios and metrics as in ticking off competencies as they are achieved and 
evidence provided. This could be, for example, a letter to a client, rather than evidence-of, that is, 
how the composition and content of the letter was arrived at. However, for a number of supervising 
solicitors:  
...just a tick in the box exercise probably won’t change the quality of work the trainee 
undertakes. (Director of legal department, local government)  
Professional competence would also refer to matching levels of coherence criteria: examples would 
be portfolios that show evidence-of, ongoing formative assessment that demonstrates progression of 
learning, and ethical awareness that goes beyond adhering to the codes of professional conduct. This 
would require increasing skills in the assessor, which will be addressed more fully later on, as 
confidence in the competencies moves beyond that in which the variables are controlled and 
culturally understood, in this case the legal mechanics, to assessing increased variables as the 
requirements shift to more complex interactions with clients and the economic and political 
environments in which law must operate. Law is business, it seeks to find out through its assessments 
whether an individual can not only manage such interfacing but also demonstrate such ‘pragmatic’ 
initiatives that are at the same time coherent and correspondent. The trainee has to be value for 
money for the profession, but more importantly for the firm that has invested in and trained the 
individual. . Therefore, matching coherence is about being eligible for the profession through the 
coherence of the evidence that is required and available within the limitations of the system of 
training. All possible forms of evidence need not be present but additional evidence, confirmative, 
collaborative or opposing to the evidential claim may not be possible until the newly qualified 
solicitor begins to function as such.  
Up to this stage assessors in the legal profession were generally confident of correspondence and 
accepting of the limitation of evidence of coherence as this was partly imposed by the profession’s 
training system itself. However when assessing the qualities an individual trainee needs to have to be 
offered a position in the assessing firm, in their unanimous opinion, the increase in variables and 
making a decision about quality, were both seen as risky and subject to perceptions of subjectivity 
although they were otherwise confident of their assessment. At this stage the assessment of quality 
becomes pragmatic: could the individual bring in or maintain business; embody the culture of the 
firm; articulate the culture; be part of a cohesive whole; loyal; generally hierarchical towards the 
purpose of keeping the firm in business and protecting its reputation? How could justifiable belief in 
an individual trainee be justified? The supervising solicitors were fully aware of the ‘t’ (temporal) 
factor in justifiable belief and were therefore looking for the capacity in a trainee to adapt positively 
to changes that might occur over time brought about by pragmatic responses to shifting external 
factors such as markets, as this comment explained.  
...the City’s regulation, and how it’s been applied and what they say, what this particular 
regulation actually means in practice and how they’d apply it and who you’d need to go to... 
and so it’s actually how it works, it’s knowing how it works, knowing contacts, having the 
experience, getting enough experience of the detail. It’s your trade, it’s knowing the ‘trade 
secrets’ if you like..., understanding the knowledge, and to be a good lawyer you need an 
awful lot more of that than you need of the law...that takes time and a good supervisor. 
(Training partner, a ‘magic circle’ firm, London) 
In addition, it was noted that assessment of the qualities of the trainee became more predicated on the 
qualities required of the assessing senior practitioner to go beyond the relative safety of 
correspondence and coherence.  
The portfolio evidence might be useful perhaps for a smaller firm or high street practice, 
perhaps, but in our practice where you are really relying on the specialist partner to judge 
whether or not they’ve done a fantastic job in corporate or in real estate, when they are 
working with them, attaching all the portfolio evidence is not a useful exercise. (Senior 
partner, large outer London firm) 
 
The following, extracted from interviews and a survey, were some of the qualities supervising 
solicitors said they were looking for which they believed required experienced judgement but which 
were open to being thought of as opinions of the person rather than the performance:  
• enthusiasm;  
• greater initiative;  
• self-awareness;  
• capacity for reflection;  
• ability to take responsibility for learning and movement from passivity to actual performance.  
It’s always going to be subjective, different views of what constitutes clear and concise 
language for example. You get 15 bodies in a room; you may get 10 different views! You 
may get 20 different views! (Senior partner large legal firm North of England) 
 
The evaluation team made a number of recommendations to ensure not only quality in the 
overlapping areas of coherence and pragmatism but in articulating the process of how a decision is 
arrived at, evidence –of, on qualities for a particular culture, environment and purpose in a regular 
changing dynamic. These included : the introduction of edifying conversations throughout the trainee 
period as described previously; and challenging the notion of the ‘subjective’ which senior 
supervising solicitors believed left them exposed to accusations of favouritism; prejudice; false 
assumptions; personal agendas and complaints.  These are issues with which higher education in 
general is familiar particularly in higher level awards where assessment is in the hands of ‘experts’ 
and relating to which quality assurance cannot offer any hearing for an aggrieved student who wants 
to challenge an ‘academic decision’. The team became increasingly aware of the lack of conceptual 
frames and language for the articulation of such quality processes from expert practitioners. As one 
experienced lawyer and training supervisor said on how helpful articulation of outcomes and 
expectations could be, and this was echoed by a number of others,  
[we’ve] got to show that they’ [trainees] are competent against all these criteria we judge 
against and then it’s easier to show, ‘Well it’s not because you’re an ethnic minority or a 
woman or whatever that you’re not progressing; it’s because you’re not fulfilling this.’ So it’s 
helping firms tackle things and sometimes discrimination is a kind of wildcard you know, it 
makes it very difficult to manage the situation because allegations are being made of bullying 
and under performance or whatever. It makes it much easier to kind of manage things better 
if the criteria can be objective, so you’re not talking about their character or whatever, it’s 
simply their performance. So having all the kind of terminology, the framework of work 
based learning.... it takes it away from being a subjective assessment into a more kind of 
objective one… Issues of discrimination, I think, would be less likely to arise because it’s 
more objective.  
 
Another solicitor commented:  
part of the reason work references have become bland is because no past employer wants to 
be accused of misrepresentation. Again, part of the struggle I have with portability [of 
portfolios with assessments] is the risk of being accused of misrepresentation [which] only 
increases if you’re disclosing all your appraisal reports, and...you can conceive of 
circumstances where the trainee says, ‘But that comment wasn’t fair’ but it’s in the appraisal 
form. And I really think it’s fraught with difficulty. 
  
Such issues left some individual firms in a dilemma. The desire for being able to prove a trainee 
could meet correspondence criteria ie basic standards of competences meant a level of 
instrumentality that deconstructed the practice and disposition of the candidates to ‘mere’ activities 
unrelated to the actuality of successful professional practice without sufficient indications of 
suitability beyond correspondence. Assessment of correspondence therefore did not require any 
practice of quality of judgement of performance beyond technical tasks. However  to take this 
process beyond correspondence  required active engagement of the judgements of the firm’s 
principles. It required a real and discriminating sense of the use of judgement as to the potential of 
trainees to master the needs of the firm and to embrace the firm’s culture and practices. This leads to 
pertinent questions surrounding what is meant by the ‘practice of quality ‘by experts? At the 
pragmatic level, particularly in the professions and in academia, quality can only be assessed by 
practitioner ‘experts’ whose assessment of quality can be perceived as subjective if not adequately 
articulated:  
What I’m thinking is that if you can see people’s portfolios, after they’ve been assessed as 
competent, you might look at that portfolio and question why they were assessed as 
competent. (Senior partner, inner city firm London) 
...that’s the whole thing trying to put your finger on what makes somebody competent to be a 
qualified solicitor. And there are so many factors that affect that. You could have, extreme 
example, somebody whose work is excellent, who understands the law very well, but they 
cannot communicate with clients, and you know that that person would never be able to...and 
you think, ‘Ah, they just wouldn’t be able to express legal concepts in an understandable 
way. They really probably shouldn’t be practising as a solicitor’...but for another firm they 
may be assess them as ideal. (Training Partner, Large practice, North of England) 
 
Articulation of expert judgement 
While the articulation and justification of judgement of correspondence and coherence can be met 
with the assistance of regulatory requirements and the development of increasingly sophisticated 
techniques and artefacts, in order to help in the justification of the role of the ‘expert practitioner’ as 
an assessor of quality of what constitutes ‘qualified’ for the profession when assessing whether the 
individual is qualified for a particular environment and role, the pragmatic dimension of quality, and 
the one most exposed to being perceived as subjective, it is appropriate to look at how others have 
articulated the justification of the judgement of the expert view. The intention of this paper is not to 
exhaustively mine this area but to provide pointers for further research into the development of an 
articulation of what can be perceived as subjective when left without a proper articulation of 
justification and of the process of arriving at judgement . If left without this articulation judgement is 
open to perceptions of subjectivity and to mitigate subjectivity  the voice of the ‘expert’ may become 
instrumentalised through tools and artefacts as used in correspondence and in coherence. As can be 
seen by the extracts from the case study, senior practitioners were confident in their judgements of 
quality but lost for words in explaining the reasoning behind the decisions especially regarding the 
more pragmatic second purpose of assessment: suitability for being kept on by the firm or legal 
department.  
The term ‘practical wisdom’ has come to prominence in recent years as the academic and 
professional worlds seek to articulate the basis for the justification of expert judgement (Maxwell 
2007). The term is drawn from the dominance of wise practical judgement in the work of Aristotle 
Practical wisdom alongside art, knowledge, philosophic wisdom and comprehension constitute the 
five forms of knowing. Aristotle concluded that ‘practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true 
state of capacity to act with regard to human goods’ (Aristotle 1140b:20/21 and is a form of 
rationality which deals with opinion. Moreover, Aristotle argued that the experience of the 
practically wise gives their opinions equal validity with that of demonstrated (empirical) fact. More 
recently the notion of what constitutes expertise (Claxton, 2000, Lazarus, 2000) cannot be left out of 
issues of quality in higher education in which there are according to Knorr Cetina knowledge 
complexities specific to that expertise in knowledge–centred practices (Knorr Cetina, 2000). For 
Melrose (2011) from her perspective in the performing arts which is regularly challenged to 
articulate the quality of the expert ‘expertise can be recognised in its practices, and attributed on that 
basis to its practitioners, without those who recognise it being able to articulate discursively, in 
detail, what constitutes it. Is it, on this basis, un-speakable, or have we simply not yet determined 
how to speak and write it?’ (authors italics)  
Melrose (2007 p.1) supports the transformation of the notion of ‘subjective’ when referring to 
decisions arrived at by experts into ‘expert -intuitive processes’ providing a conceptual and language 
frame in which to articulate the practice of quality at the pragmatic level where assessment of quality 
goes beyond basic skills and techniques.  This is not unlike a scientist who, through the course of a 
career, increasingly masters the variables of the domain through collective concepts and equations  
that  act much like metaphor: have a simplicity that embodies volumes of knowledge. The scientist is 
not seen to be subjective. In higher education, and in this case example of senior assessing solicitors, 
the practice/subject expert in saying ‘in the end I just know’ can be the equivalent of the equation 
behind which there is considerable knowledge of the complexity of pragmatic practice. These views 
are from senior practitioners from a range of firms in London and other parts of England.  
 
You’ve just got to trust the lawyer that they’re working with to form a view as to whether or 
not they are up to it or not. Senior training partner, London firm 
 
It’s a bit of a nebulous concept. You just can’t put your finger on it, you just know whether 
somebody is... You get a sort of gut feeling, really. Senior training supervisor North West 
England 
Before they get a training contract, they’ve been psychometrically tested, they’ve done 
logical thinking tests, they’ve done verbal reasoning tests, they’ve done negotiation exercises 
and they’ve done all sorts of things. And so you build up a body of evidence as to what you 
know about this individual and where their strengths and weaknesses are. But there’s still a 
part of the judgement that almost, you know, is on top of that. So you can use evidence... The 
more evidence you have and the reason more and more law firms and other professions do 
more testing of undergraduates is they want a body of evidence, they want to have more 
information when they’re hiring people. But where I begin to struggle, you can never 
objectify that 100%...It goes back to what we were talking about a while ago, which is you 
can never wholly objectify the assessment of whether someone is competent or not competent 
to be a solicitor.  Head of Training North East of England 
 
The practice of quality therefore requires of the expert practitioner an articulation of the justification 
for their justified belief in a way that is trustworthy and transparent and for which the expert can be 
held accountable by their peers. The testimonial for the practical wisdom that defines the expert 
needs to contain some form of track record, a reputation for correspondence, coherence and 
pragmatism in their own practices as professionals as well as assessors in which the experience on 
which any judgement is based is that from which new learning has been derived, applied and updated 
and not that which is the repetition of one experience many times.  
The notion of quality in work-based higher education requires evolving conceptual frames and 
language in which to both practise and articulate the assessment of quality and the quality of 
assessment. This paper offers a frame drawn from Wittgenstein, its applicability in a recent piece of 
major research and an invitation to explore the notion of expert and their role, in the Wittgenstein 
formula, at the pragmatic stage of assessment during which the student or candidate seeks entry into 
a professional culture or set up or into the higher levels of practice in that profession.  
 
Concluding comments 
We have tried to encourage further exploration of this issue in other professional bodies and 
professions including academia and higher education. It is an underexplored aspect of quality 
assessment and has implications for current and future collaborations between the professions and 
academia. In work-based learning it has implications as assessment moves towards involving 
professional experts in academic assessment and enhances academic assessment through constantly 
enquiring into the basis on which a judgement is made which requires more than the acceptance of 
the person as being an expert. The findings show an emerging understanding about how quality 
assessment that emerges from expertise can be more adequately defined and articulated thus 
countering challenges of subjectivity and discrimination. It was found that the professional experts’ 
accountability of quality assessment in the legal profession was pertinent to higher education and 
higher education was able to provide such professionals with an articulation that positioned their 
expert assessments more objectively. The paper provides a contribution to the underexplored area of 
the wide acceptance that being an expert is sufficient to judge quality. Such judgements need to be 
accountable through articulation of the components of quality.  
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